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Abstract 
The principle of vicarious liability is, to some extent, incoherent. It is 
indisputable that the case law has moved well beyond the original confines of the 
doctrine — the basis of its imposition having, to some extent, undercut by 
development elsewhere in tort law, and its rationale continuing to be subject to 
conjecture and disagreement. This article seeks to improve the situation by 
suggesting that the law of vicarious liability should be reconceptualised as having 
its basis in the law of agency. It does so in the context of the liability of 
educational providers to victims of abuse. 
I Introduction 
The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (‘Royal 
Commission’) continues to hold hearings into alleged abuse within institutions, 
primarily educational institutions. The scale of the alleged abuse is staggering. The 
Royal Commission’s Redress and Civil Litigation Report estimates a possible 
60 000 survivors of institutional sexual abuse thus far.1 The Commission’s hearings 
and findings will have flow-on effects on many facets of the legal system. It is 
expected that there may be an increase in civil claims against educational providers 
for alleged abuse, as well as substantial reform to relevant legislation.2 
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1 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress 
and Civil Litigation Report (2015) 8 (‘Redress Report’). 
2 The Redress Report recommended implementation of a redress scheme, as an alternative to civil 
litigation as a means of compensating survivors: ibid, 322, 390. It would have a maximum payout 
cap of $200 000 (at 252); and would only be available to those who agreed not to pursue a civil claim 
(at 390). Given that a successful civil damages claim would often be for a substantially higher figure, 
it is not known whether, even if implemented, this redress scheme will substantially reduce the 
number of civil claimants. And at the time of writing, it is not clear whether such a scheme will be 
implemented, particularly given the cost involved. The Commission recommended substantial 
reforms to legislation in relation to limitation periods (at 52–3); introduction of a non-delegable duty 
of care owed by institutional care providers (at 77–8); a reverse onus of proof provision (at 56); and 
reforms to make it easier for survivors of abuse to identify an appropriate body to sue (at 58–9). 
Again, it is not currently known whether these suggested reforms will be implemented. See also 
Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 
Consultation Paper: Criminal Justice (2016). 
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Several cases have recently considered the civil liability of educational 
providers for abuse, committed by their employees, of victims under their care 
(usually children), including the recent High Court of Australia decision Prince 
Alfred College Inc v ADC.3 This sad situation raises many important and difficult 
legal issues, primarily: the question of the extent to which the educational provider 
is vicariously liable for the abuser’s actions; the extent to which the educational 
provider may be deemed directly negligent for what has occurred; and, in some 
cases, questions of limitation periods, given that the survivor of the abuse may not 
seek legal redress until long after the events. It goes without saying that, quite apart 
from any legal issues, survivors of sexual abuse require society’s deepest 
compassion and caring for what they have suffered, the symptoms and consequences 
of which may endure through their lives. As a society, we must do what we can to 
assist in the healing process, and it is recognised that the legal system can play its 
part in this, as part of a much broader response.4 However, in and of itself, the fact 
a person has suffered abuse does not (and should not) automatically translate to an 
actionable legal claim against the institution who engaged the abuser.5 
The extent to which an educational provider may be vicariously liable for the 
actions of their employee is part of a bigger issue of the future of the principle of 
vicarious liability in the law. Courts in the modern era continue to struggle to 
articulate a rational basis for the doctrine, tests of liability remain very difficult to 
apply in particular cases, and fine distinctions are made that may not reflect the 
realities of current employment settings. The likely increase in the number of claims 
in this area will place in the spotlight the appropriateness of current legal principle. 
This article surveys recent major developments in the law on vicarious 
liability. The main focus of the discussion will be the question of the liability of 
educational providers for abuse. However, these questions cannot be answered in 
isolation from the more general principles of vicarious liability and other liability 
issues, including limitation periods.6 Thus, some cases that do not directly involve 
questions of educational institutions and abuse will be discussed. Part II of this 
article summarises the existing law in three jurisdictions: Canada, the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’) and Australia, including the recent High Court of Australia 
decision in Prince Alfred College.7 A comparison among these jurisdictions is 
appropriate given the common law tradition they share, and because superior courts 
																																																								
3 (2016) 335 ALR 1 (‘Prince Alfred College’). 
4 On restorative justice in this context, see Anne-Marie McAlinden and Bronwyn Naylor, ‘Reframing 
Public Inquiries as “Procedural Justice” for Victims of Institutional Child Abuse: Towards a Hybrid 
Model of Justice’ (2016) 38(3) Sydney Law Review 277; Simone Degeling and Kit Barker, ‘Private 
Law and Grave Historical Injustice: The Role of the Common Law’ (2015) 41(2) Monash University 
Law Review 377; Redress Report, above n 1. The Royal Commission canvassed other remedies such 
as apologies (at 140–56); counselling and psychological care for survivors (at 177–218); and 
statutory and other schemes for compensation (at 219–62). It also recommended introduction of a 
national redress scheme (at 26) and noted deficiencies with civil litigation responses (at 92–3). 
5 Richard Townshend-Smith, ‘Vicarious Liability for Sexual (and Other) Assaults’ (2000) 8(2) Tort 
Law Review 108, 122: ‘That there may be particular sympathy for the victims of sexual assaults 
cannot itself provide an adequate justification for the imposition of vicarious liability.’ 
6 Recently, the High Court of Australia found an action against an educational provider for abuse 
committed many years earlier by one of its employees was barred due to the passing of time: Prince 
Alfred College (2016) 335 ALR 1. 
7 Ibid. 
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of each jurisdiction regularly refer to, and often adopt, principles developed from the 
others in this area of law. Part III critiques existing theories of vicarious liability. 
Part IV explores the potential of agency principles to rationalise principle in 
this area. This is important because, while historically vicarious liability had an 
agency basis, modern case law tends not to use this concept. The thesis of this article 
is that vicarious liability is best sourced in principles of agency, and the law should 
return to it, and its limits. Concededly, the High Court in Prince Alfred College did 
not utilise agency principles. However, over the long term, the basis of vicarious 
liability has changed greatly. Furthermore, in tort law more broadly, concepts have 
undergone rapid transformation and refinement, for example strict liability8 and 
liability of public authorities for non-feasance.9 In this light, it is not too late for 
reconceptualisation of the law of vicarious liability. In saying this, it is 
acknowledged that the legal principle of vicarious liability is just one of the legal 
principles affecting the question of financial compensation for survivors of 
institutional sexual abuse. Other legal rules, for instance statutes of limitation and 
the so-called ‘Ellis defence’,10 have made it difficult in practice for survivors of 
sexual abuse to obtain legal redress. There has been both successful11 and 
unsuccessful12 legislative reform in this area. An outcome of the Royal Commission 
may well be further legal reforms, in substantive and procedural law, to facilitate 
compensation claims by survivors of institutional sexual abuse.13 Further, the full 
force of negligence principles should be applied directly against institutions that do 
not take proper care in the selection or supervision of staff members. While in the 
past, institutions may have argued ignorance about possible child sexual abuse, or 
difficulty in obtaining information about a person’s past record, no one today can 
claim to be unaware of the risk of abuse, or legitimately complain of difficulties in 
researching an individual’s past.14 
In other words, there have been legitimate arguments in the past that vicarious 
liability must be robustly applied to institutions because otherwise survivors of such 
abuse may be left without a remedy.15 However, given robust application of 
negligence principles, developments in accessibility of information, past recent 
																																																								
8 The so-called doctrine in Rylands v Fletcher (1886) LR l Ex 265 was subsumed into the general law 
of negligence in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 (‘Burnie’). 
9 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
10 The Ellis defence provided that church leaders may use limited liability as a shield against claims for 
abuse committed by others if a church was an unincorporated association: see Trustees of the Roman 
Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565. See also Redress 
Report, above n 1, 58–9. 
11 Regarding the removal of limitation periods for alleged child sexual abuse, see Limitation Act 1969 
(NSW) s 6A; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27P; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11A. 
The Redress Report recommended the removal of the limitation period with respect to child sexual 
abuse claims: above n 1, 434–59. 
12 Roman Catholic Church Trust Property Amendment (Justice for Victims) Bill 2014 (NSW). 
13 The Redress Report recommended substantial legal reforms to overcome difficulties in survivors 
identifying the appropriate body to sue, issues often described in shorthand form as the ‘Ellis 
defence’: Redress Report, above n 1, 496–511. It also recommended a reverse onus be applied to 
such claims: at 56–7. 
14 The Royal Commission noted that while abuse continued, past years probably reflected higher rates 
of abuse, explained by different social attitudes towards children, and past unquestioning acceptance 
of authority: Redress Report, above n 1, 5. 
15 Redress Report, above n 1, 92–3, 461–4. 
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reforms and possible future reform due to the Royal Commission’s work, these 
concerns may be lessened. The article will now briefly consider the history and 
rationale of vicarious liability, examine the authorities, and critique existing 
rationales, before suggesting a reconception of this area of law on the basis of agency 
principles. It will be argued that given changes in the law of negligence, the rationale 
for imposing vicarious liability has (largely) evaporated, even if this is little 
recognised in the cases. 
II Vicarious Liability: Brief History and Rationale 
There can at least be agreement about the history of the principle of vicarious 
liability. It was created in a very different societal context than that pertaining today. 
It applied typically to a head of household, where most businesses were small, 
family-run enterprises.16 The head would be liable for the actions of members of that 
household, whether family members or ‘serfs’. 
There was a move to limit the head of household’s liability in this context. It 
was decided that the head of household was only liable for actions of household 
members that they had expressly consented to or commanded (the ‘consent and 
command theory’), excepting fire. This theory applied initially to criminal cases, but 
later extended to civil liability. There is evidence of this ‘consent and command’ 
theory in statute17 and case law18 in medieval and Middle Age England.19 
This theory was workable when businesses were small, household-centred 
operations. As the size and complexity of business grew, and as owners of businesses 
grew remote from day-to-day business operations, the theory became redundant. A 
theory emerged that an employer was liable for things they had ‘impliedly 
commanded’, things analogous or closely related to things they had expressly 
commanded.20 It was a short step from this theory of implied command to concepts 
of ‘scope of employment’: that an employer was liable for what an employee did 
acting within the scope of what their employment.21 Relatedly, an employer was not 
vicariously liable for employee actions committed while on a ‘frolic’.22 
At one time, an employer’s liability was limited to actions of their employee 
committed for the employer’s benefit, because this was one of the rationales given 
for why an employer was liable for their employee’s actions.23 It continues to be 
																																																								
16 Justice O W Holmes Jr, ‘Agency’ (1891) 4(8) Harvard Law Review 345, 351–2. 
17 Staple, Merchant Strangers, Money Act, 27 Edw 3, c 19: ‘no merchant nor other … shall lose or 
forfeit his goods nor merchandizes for the trespass and forefeiture of his servant unless he do it by 
the command or procurement of his master’. 
18 Waltham v Mulgar (1606) Moo KB 776; 72 ER 899; John H Wigmore, ‘Responsibility for Tortious 
Acts: It’s History’ (1894) 7(6) Harvard Law Review 315, 333–4. 
19 John H Wigmore, ‘Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History — II’ (1894) 7(7) Harvard Law 
Review 384. 
20 Middleton v Fowler (1699) 1 Salk 282; 91 ER 247 (Holt CJ) (‘Middleton’); Sir William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–9) vol 1, 429. 
21 Stone v Cartwright (1796) 6 TR 411; 101 ER 622; Barwick v English Joint Stock Bank (1867) LR 2 
Ex 259, 265 (Willes J) (‘Barwick’). 
22 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 Car & P 501, 503; 172 ER 1338, 1339 (Parke B). 
23 ‘[T]he reason that I am liable is this, by employing him I set the whole thing in motion; and what he 
does, being done for my benefit and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing 
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reflected in relevant American law.24 However, this requirement was abandoned in 
England in 1912.25 This development was critical, and it will be returned to below. 
Limits of the doctrine and its ‘implied command’ basis were tested when it was 
sought to make an employer liable for actions of an employee that had been 
specifically prohibited by the employer, an attempt that proved successful.26 They 
were also tested when it was sought to make an employer liable for deliberate criminal 
activity by an employee, as opposed to mere negligence. Possible liability in such 
cases was also admitted,27 making the implied command theory no longer tenable. 
To some extent, the law of vicarious liability was developed at a time when 
legal principles such as the doctrine of common employment could otherwise bar 
recovery against an employer,28 and prior to general acceptance of fault-based 
liability under the neighbour principle, which liberalised recognition of duty of care 
responsibilities.29 Today it sits precariously within the law of tort;30 at odds with the 
explosive growth of fault-based negligence liability, the High Court of Australia’s 
rejection of longstanding principles of strict liability elsewhere in tort,31 and the 
general principle that one person is not liable for actions or omissions of another.32 
This might explain the variety of means, including policy means, used to try to 
justify the doctrine.33 It might suggest that some examples traditionally given as 
																																																								
it’: Duncan v Findlater (1839) 6 Cl & F 894, 910; 7 ER 934, 940 (Lord Brougham) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted) (‘Duncan’). In Turberville v Stampe, Holt CJ, the judge credited with the initial 
recognition of vicarious liability, explained that an employer could be liable for actions of an employee 
not specifically authorised where ‘it shall be intended, that the servant had authority from his master, 
it being for his master’s benefit’: (1697) 1 Ld Raym 264, 265; 91 ER 1072, 1073. For critique, see 
William O Douglas, ‘Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I’ (1928) 38(5) Yale Law Journal 
584, 584. Baty asks how obiter dicta of Holt CJ in various cases of the late 17th and early 18th centuries 
‘acquired the force of law’: T Baty, Vicarious Liability (Claredon Press, 1916) 28. 
24 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) § 7.07 discusses the ‘scope of 
employment’, excluding from it an employee’s independent course of conduct not intended by the 
employee to serve any purpose of the employer. 
25 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 (‘Lloyd’). 
26 Limpus v London General Omnibus Co (1862) 1 Hurl & C 526; 158 ER 993 (‘Limpus’). 
27 Lloyd [1912] AC 716. 
28 Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1; 150 ER 1030. 
29 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. As an example, Laski wrote in 1916: ‘public policy obviously 
requires a means of forcing masters to keep continual watch over the conduct of their servants, and 
it is difficult to see how that end would otherwise be attained [other than through the principle of 
vicarious liability]’: Harold J Laski, ‘The Basis of Vicarious Liability’ (1916) 26(2) Yale Law Journal 
105, 116. Obviously, failure by an employer to keep watch over their employees would today be 
remedied by negligence law, and a finding that the employer was directly liable for negligently failing 
to supervise. However, this remedy was not generally available in 1916. 
30 P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, 1967) 12. 
31 Burnie (1994) 179 CLR 520. 
32 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 262 (Dixon J), cited approvingly in Modbury Triangle Shopping 
Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 264 [20] (Gleeson CJ), 299 [140] (Callinan J). 
33  [T]ort law generally is deeply fault-based. It reflects our deep-seated psychological and moral 
convictions that responsibility should be attributed to someone on the basis of fault and that other 
forms of responsibility have less validity. The issue of vicarious liability is thus a difficult one 
in a fault-based system. … [I]n the cases on vicarious liability … courts [are] struggling to justify 
the imposition of liability on a person who has done nothing wrong. It is this struggle which 
compels the courts to rely heavily on policy arguments in an attempt to justify the outcome. 
 Prue Vines, ‘New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland: Schools’ 
Responsibility for Teachers’ Sexual Assault: Non-Delegable Duty and Vicarious Liability’ (2003) 27(2) 
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applications of vicarious liability are better seen, at least with hindsight, as instances 
of personal or direct liability, and that it is unhelpful to mix them.34 
Intuitively, it is important to determine the rationale for particular legal 
principles. This is useful where there are reasonable differences of opinion regarding 
application of the principle in difficult cases. Specifically, where the rationale for a 
tort doctrine would be coherent with a finding of liability in a particular case, a 
finding of liability is more defensible there. In this light, one must acknowledge 
strong scepticism that any particular rationale can explain the principle of vicarious 
liability as it currently stands: 
I am not persuaded that there is any reason of principle or policy which can 
be of substantial guidance in the resolution of the problem of applying the rule 
in any particular case. Theory may well justify the existence of the concept, 
but it is hard to find guidance from any underlying principle which will weigh 
in the decision whether in a particular case a particular wrongful act by the 
employee would be seen [to be within the scope of employment].35 
Five members of the High Court of Australia acknowledged earlier cases had not 
disclosed any ‘clear or stable principle … underpinning the development of this area 
of the law’.36 The reasons noted the policy basis of the modern doctrine of vicarious 
liability, but acknowledged that what the precise policy actually was had not been 
properly articulated.37 These sentiments were recently repeated in Prince Alfred 
College.38 Respected scholars are also of the same view.39 
																																																								
Melbourne University Law Review 612, 625. See also Paula Giliker, ‘Making the Right Connection: 
Vicarious Liability and Institutional Responsibility’ (2009) 17(1) Torts Law Journal 35, 35. 
34 Giliker criticises the House of Lords decision in Lister for this: Paula Giliker, ‘Rough Justice in an 
Unjust World’ (2002) 65 (March) Modern Law Review 269, 276. See also Nick McBride, Vicarious 
Liability Cases Mcbridesguides, 2 <https://mcbridesguides.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/vicarious-
liability-cases.pdf> (emphasis altered): ‘Now — it seems that the House of Lords in Lister was 
completely incapable of grasping this point; that … liability in … situations [involving intentional 
misconduct by employees are] examples of personal liability rather than vicarious liability.’ McIvor 
also documents confusion in decisions between direct liability and vicarious liability: Claire McIvor, 
‘The Use and Abuse of the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability’ (2006) 35(4) Common Law World Review 
268, 288–96. 
35 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215, 232 [35] (Lord Clyde) (‘Lister’). See also E v English 
Province of Our Lady of Charity [2013] QB 722, where Ward LJ, after considering various suggested 
rationales for the doctrine and explaining deficiencies in each as explanations of current principle, 
concluded ‘no single rationale provides a complete answer for the imposition of vicarious liability’: 
at 761 [53]. His Lordship agreed with Fleming that the doctrine could only be seen as based on a 
combination of policy considerations: 761 [53] citing Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), 
Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 10th ed 2011). See also Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, 
‘Agency II’ (1891) 5(1) Harvard Law Review 1, 22. 
36 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161, 166–7 [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (‘Sweeney’). 
37 Ibid. 
38 ‘[V]icarious liability has been regarded as an unstable principle, one for which a “fully satisfactory 
rationale for the imposition of vicarious liability” has been “slow to appear in the case law”’: Prince 
Alfred College (2016) 335 ALR 1, 8 [39] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), quoting 
Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21, 37 [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ) (‘Hollis’). 
39 See, eg, Glanville Williams, ‘Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity’ (1957) 20(3) Modern 
Law Review 220, 231: ‘[V]icarious liability is the creation of many judges who have had different 
ideas of its justification or social policy, or no idea at all. Some judges may have extended the rule 
more widely, or confined it more narrowly than its true rationale would allow.’ Justice Oliver Wendell 
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Despite these misgivings, various rationales have been utilised to justify the 
doctrine. To some extent, they overlap. They include the agency idea that the 
employee is acting with the apparent or ostensible authority of the employer,40 which 
connects with the command (express and implied) theory traditionally underpinning 
this area of law, and reflected in some Australian case law,41 if not Prince Alfred 
College. Alternatives include that:  
 as between two innocent parties, it is better that the loss fall on the employer 
because they employed the wrongdoer;42  
 the concept of ‘enterprise risk’;43 
 the employer will be better able to spread the risk through insurance;44 
 it is simply a ‘loss-distribution device’;45  
 its purpose is to find a solvent defendant with means to pay compensation;46 
and/or  
																																																								
Holmes Jr called vicarious liability an irrational fiction: Holmes, above n 35. 22–3; Baty dismissed 
attempts to find a rationale for vicarious liability as ‘hopeless groping’: Baty, above n 23, 148. 
40 Middleton (1699) 1 Salk 282; 91 ER 247, 248 (Holt CJ); Barwick (1867) LR 2 Ex 259, 265–6 
(Willes J); Kay v I.T.W. Ltd [1968] 1 QB 140; Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 
AC 552, 587 (Lord Wilberforce) (‘Branwhite’); New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 
554–5 [108]–[111] (Gaudron J) (‘Lepore’). Gaudron J also used the concept of estoppel in her agency 
analysis. Agency and its links with vicarious liability are explored in Gerard McMeel, ‘Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Agency’ (2000) 116(3) Law Quarterly Review 387. 
41 For example, in Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370 (‘Deatons’), Dixon J considered whether 
the employee’s actions were done under the employer’s ‘express or implied authority’ (at 381–2); 
Latham CJ referred to the ‘authority’ the employment conferred on the employee (at 378); 
McTiernan J referred to ‘implied authority’ (at 382); and Webb J referred to the employee’s ‘express 
or implied authority’ (at 388). Contrasting views appeared in Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 
(‘Scott’), where Gleeson CJ asked whether the employee was the defendant’s agent (at 341 [13]–
[16]) and Gummow J denied vicarious liability was based on agency concepts (at 413 [239]). Justice 
McHugh used the concept of agency to clarify vicarious liability in Hollis (2001) 207 CLR 21,  
51 [74]. Members of the High Court in Lepore also referred to and applied concepts of agency in 
applying vicarious liability: Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 560 [128] (Gaudron J), 593–4 [235]–[239] 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
42 Hern v Nichols (1709) 1 Salk 289, 289; 91 ER 256, 256 (Holt CJ) (‘Hern’). Obviously, this argument 
is only sensible if the employer is not directly liable for negligence — for example, by employing 
the wrongdoer, by giving them inappropriate duties given their experience, or by not supervising 
appropriately. If the employer were directly liable to the victim/survivor in negligence, a rationale 
for making the institution liable vicariously (namely, because it is better that they should bear the 
loss than the victim) becomes redundant. 
43 Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534, 548–9 [22] (McLachlin J, for the Court) (‘Bazley’); Dubai 
Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366, 377 [21] (Lord Nicholls), 386 [65] (Lord Slynn 
agreeing), 386 [66] (Lord Hutton agreeing) (‘Dubai Aluminium’). In Lepore, some members of the 
Court apparently accepted enterprise risk as a satisfactory rationale for vicarious liability: Lepore 
(2003) 212 CLR 511, 612–13 [303] (Kirby J); while others did not: at 543 [65] (Gleeson CJ),  
589 [223] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
44 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 554 [31] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
45 Lister [2002] 1 AC 215, 243 [65] (Lord Millett); Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 614 [306] (Kirby J). 
See also Atiyah, above n 30, 27: ‘[L]oss distribution is the most rational justification that can be 
offered for vicarious liability today’. 
46 ‘The policy objective underlying vicarious liability is to ensure … liability for tortious wrong is borne 
by a defendant with the means to compensate the victim’ where it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’: 
Vicarious Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1, 15 [34] (Lord Phillips, for the 
Court) (‘Various Claimants’). Willes J refers in Limpus to the ‘deep pockets’ of the defendant: Limpus 
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 imposition of vicarious liability will deter undesired conduct.47 
Or, perhaps the rationale of vicarious liability is simply to impose liability on an 
employer where it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to do so.48 These theories will be 
considered in more detail in Part III of the article. 
It would usually be expected that a rationale for legal doctrine would explain 
its contours and case outcomes. This does not occur in relation to vicarious liability. 
For instance, the sharp distinction the law has traditionally made between vicarious 
liability for employees and (lack of) vicarious liability for independent contractors49 
is difficult to justify on any of the above rationales.50 This situation is unsatisfactory. 
III The Existing State of Authorities on Institutional 
Liability for Abuse 
A Canada 
The leading Canadian authority is Bazley.51 The case involved a defendant which 
operated residential care facilities for emotionally troubled children. The defendant 
hired an employee who was, unknown to them, a paedophile. The employee was 
convicted of 19 counts of sexual abuse against children in the defendant’s care. The 
question was whether the defendant was vicariously liable for the actions of its 
employee. 
The Supreme Court of Canada noted the oft-cited Salmond test that an 
employer was vicariously liable for acts of employees that were authorised by the 
employer, and unauthorised acts so connected with authorised acts that they could 
																																																								
(1862) 1 Hurl & C 526, 539; 158 ER 993, 998. Glofcheski states that ‘introduction of the concept of 
vicarious liability into the law of tort was largely driven by the pragmatic consideration of finding a 
“deep pocket” to ensure that compensation is paid’: Rick Glofcheski, ‘A Frolic in the Law of Tort: 
Expanding the Scope of Employers’ Vicarious Liability’ (2004) 12(1) Tort Law Review 18, 20. See 
also Townshend-Smith: ‘the quality of these justifications [for vicarious liability is] … sufficiently 
weak that the real practical justification for the doctrine is little more than that of finding a deep pocket 
… by which to ensure that an innocent victim does not go uncompensated’: above n 5, 108. 
47 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 554–5 [32]–[33] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
48 Ibid 552–4 [29]–[31] (McLachlin J, for the Court); Various Claimants [2013] 2 AC 1, 27 [94] (Lord 
Phillips, for the Court); Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 660, 675 [42] (Lord Reed, for the Court) 
(‘Cox’); Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677, 694 [47] (Lord Toulson, with 
whom Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale, Lord Dyson MR and Lord Reed agreed) (‘Mohamud’); Lepore 
(2003) 212 CLR 511, 619 [320] (Kirby J), contra 626 [345] (Callinan J). Beuermann suggests a new 
rationale based on the employer’s power to direct the conduct of an employee, and the possibility of a 
conflict between the employee’s obligation to obey their employer, and the employee’s obligations 
under the general law: Christine Beuermann, ‘Dissociating the Two Forms of So-Called “Vicarious 
Liability”’ in Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W Neyers and Erika Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging 
Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, 2013) 463, 474. Though interesting, this rationale has not been accepted 
in any case law of which I am aware, so I do not discuss it in detail here. 
49 Sweeney (2006) 226 CLR 161, 167 [12] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
50 In fact, that distinction was (at the very least) substantially minimised in Various Claimants [2013] 
2 AC 1, 18 [47] and by McHugh J in Hollis (2001) 207 CLR 21, 57 [93]. 
51 [1999] 2 SCR 534. See also G H L Fridman, ‘“The Course of Employment”: Policy or Principle?’ 
(2002) 6(1) Newcastle Law Review 61. 
2017] LIABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL PROVIDERS 175 
be considered modes, albeit improper modes, of doing authorised acts.52 The Court 
further noted that it was often difficult to distinguish between improper modes of 
doing authorised acts (for which the employer would be liable), and independent 
acts, for which the employer would not be liable.53 
After considering various categories of case in which vicarious liability had 
been recognised, the Court suggested a common theme in such cases was so-called 
‘enterprise risk’54 — that the employer’s enterprise had created the risk that led to 
the tortious act, where the employee’s conduct was ‘closely connected’ with that 
risk.55 The Court acknowledged this question may be difficult to answer, and that an 
employee’s obligations to their employer may be described at various levels of 
generality, which could influence the answer to the application of the ‘close 
connection’ test.56  
The Court also acknowledged the role of policy in developing appropriate 
principles in this area. It referred with approval to Fleming’s articulation of two 
fundamental policy concerns in the area of vicarious liability, providing a ‘just and 
practical’ remedy for the harm, and deterrence of future harm.57 Vicarious liability 
was considered fair because the employer placed in the community an enterprise 
with elements of risk. It was fair that the body which created the risk should bear the 
loss.58 This conclusion was supported by the fact that an employer was often in the 
best position to spread any losses through insurance or higher prices for its services. 
Further, an employer had tools available to reduce these risks through careful 
management.59 
In terms of the ‘close connection’ requirement, the mere fact the employer 
employed the employee, creating the opportunity for the employee to do the wrong, 
was insufficient. The wrongful act would have to be sufficiently related to conduct 
authorised by the employer to justify imposing liability.60 It would have to be said 
the employer ‘significantly increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee 
																																																								
52 [1999] 2 SCR 534, 543. 
53 Ibid 544. 
54 Townshend-Smith has pointed out three difficulties with the concept of enterprise risk in terms of a 
rationale for vicarious liability: (1) as an economic concept it forces us to assume a value attached to 
avoidance of damage,; (2) the concept is ill-suited to the public sector where the ‘costs’ cannot as 
easily be passed on to the ‘market’; and (3) economic analysis implies ability to calculate the tangible 
economic effects of a change in legal principle and put an economic value on the activities thereby 
affected: above n 5, 121–2. 
55 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 567 [57] (McLachlin J, for the Court). See also: at 548–9 [22]. 
56 Ibid 550 [24] (McLachlin J, for the Court). The ‘close connection’ test has been criticised for 
providing insufficient guidance on when liability should be imposed: Dubai Aluminium [2003] 2 AC 
366, 377–8 [25]–[26] (Lord Nicholls), 386 [65] (Lord Slynn agreeing), 386 [66] (Lord Hutton 
agreeing); Giliker, above n 33, 39–41; and for ‘nudging open’ the ‘floodgates’ of liability: 
Glofcheski, above n 46, 39. 
57 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 552–3 [29] (McLachlin J, for the Court) citing John G Fleming, The Law 
of Torts (LBC Information Services, 9th ed, 1998) 410. 
58 Ibid 554 [30] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
59 Ibid 554–5 [32]–[33] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
60 Ibid 558–9 [40] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
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in his or her position and requiring him [or her] to perform the assigned tasks’.61 
Several factors were of possible relevance.62 
The question of the closeness of connection explained the fact that, on the 
same day that Court decided Bazley, it denied vicarious liability in another case, 
where the defendant did not offer residential care, and the extent of the employee’s 
responsibilities was much narrower in scope.63 In Jacobi, a majority found the 
employer was not liable for the employee’s abuse. In this case some of the limits of 
the principles set out in Bazley became clear, the majority indicating limits to the 
economic principles cited in Bazley as rationales for vicarious liability: ‘[m]uch as 
the Court may wish to take advantage of the deeper pockets of the respondent to see 
the appellants compensated, we have no jurisdiction ex aequo bono to practise 
distributive justice.’64 The majority in Jacobi also appeared to limit the discussion 
in Bazley regarding the ability of employer defendants to spread the risk through 
insurance or by raising premiums. In Jacobi, the defendant was a non-profit 
organisation. The majority found the ability of non-profit organisations to raise 
prices to users was severely constrained, and this ought to be borne in mind in 
applying such principles to cases of non-profit defendants.65 
																																																								
61 Ibid 560 [42] (McLachlin J, for the Court) (emphasis altered). 
62 Ibid 560 [41] (McLachlin J, for the Court). The relevant factors included: (a) the opportunity the 
enterprise afforded the employee to abuse their power; (b) the extent to which the wrongful act may 
have furthered the employer’s aims (and, thus, the employee was more likely to commit them);  
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the 
employer’s business; (d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim/s; 
and (e) the vulnerability of the victim/s to the wrongful exercise of the employee’s power. 
Specifically, where the employer places the employee in a position of respect and trust, suggesting 
the child should emulate and/or obey the employee, the risk is enhanced and the more likely that 
abuse could be sheeted home to the employer: at 562 [44] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
63 Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570 (Cory, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ; McLachlin, L’Heureux-
Dubé and Bastarache JJ dissenting) (‘Jacobi’). 
64 Ibid 589 [29] (Binnie J, for Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ). 
65 Ibid 613 [71] (Binnie J, for Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ). See also EB v Order of the Oblates of Mary 
Immaculate in the Province of British Columbia [2005] 3 SCR 45. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
of Canada confirmed Jacobi does not mean non-profit organisations are never vicariously liable for 
their employees’ sexual assaults, and the old charitable immunity doctrine was no longer good law: 
John Doe v Bennett [2004] 1 SCR 436, 447–8 [24]. Indeed, generally there has been a trend towards 
no special rules for non-profits in terms of accountability: Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, ‘Accountability of 
Public Authorities Through Contextualised Determinations of Vicarious Liability and Non-Delegable 
Duties’ (2007) 57 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 46; Jason W Neyers and David Stevens, 
‘Vicarious Liability in the Charity Sector: An Examination of Bazley v Curry and Re Christian 
Brothers of Ireland in Canada’ (2005) 42(3) Canadian Business Law Journal 371; William I Innes, 
C Michael Kray and Brian J Burke, ‘Selected New Developments in the Liability of Directors and 
Officers of Charitable and Nonprofit Corporations’ (2004) 18(3) The Philanthropist 199. However, 
the Australian Royal Commission, in its Redress Report in recommending the introduction of a non-
delegable duty of care on certain kinds of institutions regarding child sexual abuse, stated that the 
reform should not apply to non-profit providers: Redress Report, above n 1, 491. 
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B Australia 
The leading Australian case of Lepore66 involved conjoined appeals. One of the 
cases involved allegations of excessive physical force being applied by a teacher to 
a pupil under his supervision and care; another involved allegations that a teacher at 
a one-teacher school had sexually abused his students. The question for the High 
Court of Australia was whether the plaintiffs could proceed against the defendant 
school authorities for causes of action based on a non-delegable duty of care that a 
school was alleged to owe a student or, in addition or in the alternative, based on 
vicarious liability. 
Past High Court decisions suggested schools might owe students a 
non-delegable duty, so that a school would be liable if students were injured 
independently of evidence the school was negligent, regardless whether it had 
purported to delegate its responsibilities to others.67 Members of the High Court in 
Lepore indicated both disagreement with the concept of a non-delegable duty in such 
cases,68 and agreement.69 There was clear ambivalence about applying 
non-delegable duties to intentional, rather than merely negligent, wrongdoing.70 
Members of the High Court cited the Salmond test approvingly, noting that 
while it was relatively easy to categorise a negligent act as an unauthorised mode of 
performing an authorised act, it was more difficult to do so for intentional acts.71 
Chief Justice Gleeson noted a difficulty with the ‘improper mode of performing an 
authorised act’ was that the answer was not always clear-cut, but depended on the 
level of generality at which one classified the range of acts that the employee was 
authorised to conduct.72 As applied to school authorities, Gleeson CJ suggested the 
answer may depend on the nature and seriousness of the criminal act.73 In the past 
sexual misconduct by a teacher would have been regarded as so far outside of what 
a teacher was employed to do as to be regarded as an independent act.74 However, 
His Honour acknowledged that elsewhere successful claims had been made in such 
																																																								
66 (2003) 212 CLR 511; see Vines, above n 33; Jane Wangmann, ‘Liability for Institutional Child 
Sexual Assault: Where Does Lepore Leave Australia?’ (2004) 28(1) Melbourne University Law 
Review 169. 
67 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
68 (2003) 212 CLR 511, 533 [34] (Gleeson CJ), 598–603 [254]–[270] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 624 
[339]–[340] (Callinan J). Justice Kirby stated where vicarious liability was relevant, it, rather than 
principles of non-delegable duty, should be applied: at 609–10 [293]–[296]. 
69 Ibid 559 [124] (Gaudron J), 565–6 [144]–[145] (McHugh J).  
70 Ibid 532 [31] (Gleeson CJ), 624 [339] (Callinan J agreeing on the point), 599 [256] (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). Justice Gaudron’s discussion of non-delegable duties referred only to negligence claims: 
at 551–3 [99]–[105]. Justice McHugh found non-delegable duties could apply to intentional conduct 
(at 562). Justice Kirby left the matter open, but seemed to indicate agreement with the position of 
McHugh J on that point: at 609–10 [293]–[296], at least in cases where vicarious liability was not 
applicable, though he clearly disagreed with Justice McHugh on other points (610). See also Vines, 
above n 33, 614–16. The Redress Report recommended reintroduction of a non-delegable duty of 
care on institutions for deliberate criminal activity in the context of child sexual abuse: Redress 
Report, above n 1, 495. 
71 Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 537 (Gleeson CJ). 
72 Ibid 539 [51]. 
73 Ibid 540 [54] (Gleeson CJ). 
74 Ibid. 
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circumstances, and that such a claim could succeed in Australia, depending on the 
nature of the connection between what the employee concerned was employed to 
do, and the misconduct.75 Chief Justice Gleeson referred to the Canadian decisions, 
and their use of ‘enterprise risk’, before noting that enterprise risk had not been 
adopted in Australia for determining whether conduct was within the scope of 
employment.76 Physical discipline could be within the scope of a teacher’s 
responsibilities.77 
Justice Gaudron preferred to couch the test in terms of principles of agency 
and estoppel. On this approach, an organisation could be liable both for actions of 
employees and independent contractors,78 provided the defendant was (or should be) 
estopped from denying the person whose acts are in question was acting as their 
agent or representative.79 Her Honour linked the estoppel approach with the ‘close 
connection’ test of Bazley, concluding that a person would not be estopped from 
denying a person was acting as their agent or representative unless there was close 
connection between what was done and what the person was engaged to do.80 
Justices Gummow and Hayne disagreed with the Bazley approach. It did not 
give sufficient significance to the fact that the abuser’s conduct was intentional, that 
the employee’s conduct was a breach of the employment agreement, and that the 
offender had clearly not been deterred by the criminal law.81 This undermined the 
argument in Bazley that vicarious liability should be imposed because it deterred 
undesirable behaviour. 
Their Honours indicated the concept of ‘enterprise risk’ may be too broad, 
not focused sufficiently on risks linked with furtherance of the venture, but could 
quickly develop into a principle that an employer was effectively liable for 
everything its employees did, because it provided the opportunity for wrongdoing to 
occur.82 Justices Gummow and Hayne also suggested an agency-type approach, 
stating an employer would be vicariously liable in either of two cases: (a) where the 
act complained of was done in intended pursuit of the employer’s interests or the 
contract of employment; or (b) where the employee’s conduct was done in ostensible 
pursuit of the employer’s business or apparent execution of the authority the 
employer held out the employee as having.83 In so doing, they were applying a 
version of the test articulated by Dixon J in an earlier decision.84 Their Honours 
lamented the law of vicarious liability had become difficult because of over-reliance 
																																																								
75 Ibid 546 [72]–[74] (Gleeson CJ). Relevant factors would include the age of the students, their 
vulnerability (if any), the tasks allocated to teachers, the number of adults who were responsible for 
the students, and the nature and circumstances of the offending. 
76 Ibid 543 [65] (Gleeson CJ). 
77 Ibid 547 [78] (Gleeson CJ). 
78 This was also the position of McHugh J, because His Honour applied the non-delegable duty principle, 
for which questions of employee versus independent contractor were irrelevant: Ibid 566 [146]. 
79 Ibid 561 [130]–[131] (Gaudron J). 
80 Ibid 561 [131] (Gaudron J). 
81 Ibid 587 [218] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
82 Ibid 589 [223] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
83 Ibid 594 [239] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
84 Deatons (1949) 79 CLR 370, 381. 
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on policy at the expense of principle. It was not enough to create liability that the 
defendant had ‘deep-pocket[s]’.85 
Justice Kirby agreed with the approach in Bazley, including the ‘enterprise 
risk’ theory and rationales for imposition of vicarious liability posited there; namely, 
fair and efficient compensation for wrongful conduct, and deterrence of future 
harm.86 His Honour favoured broad application of the ‘close connection’ test, 87 
asking when it was ‘just and reasonable’ to hold the enterprise liable for actions of 
its employee.88 His Honour agreed the fact the employment provided the occasion 
for the employee’s conduct was insufficient.89 Justice Kirby concluded, in the 
context of an educational establishment employer, the risk of an employee abusing 
students was inherent in, and characteristic of (in a small number of cases), the 
enterprise.90 
Justice Callinan found deliberate criminal conduct would usually lie well 
outside the scope of a teacher’s responsibilities, and it was unreasonable to impose 
liability for such conduct on an educational authority.91 Deliberate criminal conduct 
was unconnected with employment. His Honour rejected use of the ‘fair and just’ 
test because it would lead to uncertainty.92 
Principles of vicarious liability were considered in the recent High Court 
decision in Prince Alfred College.93 The case involved abuse committed by a 
boarding master at the appellant school many years before the legal action. The 
victim sought compensation from the appellant on the basis of direct negligence. It 
was alleged the appellant was negligent in employing the abuser, given his past 
criminal history of sexual abuse, and in choosing him for a boarding master role 
when he was a young and inexperienced teacher. It was suggested his activities 
around students were insufficiently supervised and, more generally, issue was taken 
with use of only one teacher where students were vulnerable to predatory behaviour. 
It was also alleged that the appellant was vicariously liable for the abuse, because 
the offender committed the abuse while a boarding master at the school, such that 
his activities occurred within the course of his employment. Since the victim brought 
the legal claim many years after the abuse occurred, he required an exercise of the 
Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time under the relevant legislation. 
The High Court overturned the decision of the state court that favoured the 
victim. The lower court had granted an extension of time, and had found the 
appellant vicariously liable for the actions of the boarding master. Only one (state) 
judge found the appellant directly liable in negligence.94 
																																																								
85 Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 594 [242] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
86 Ibid 612–13 [302]–[303]. 
87 Ibid 618 [320] (Kirby J). 
88 Ibid 619 [320] (Kirby J).  
89 Ibid 621 [326] (Kirby J). 
90 Ibid 621 [327]–[328] (Kirby J). 
91 Ibid 625 [342]. 
92 Ibid 626 [345] (Callinan J). 
93 (2016) 335 ALR 1. 
94 A, DC v Prince Alfred College Inc [2015] SASC 12 (4 February 2015). 
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The High Court decided that too much time had elapsed between an apparent 
resolution of the dispute, and these subsequent proceedings. This delay was, in the 
Court’s view, not justified and precluded the possibility of a fair trial.95 The Court 
expressly declined to deal with the substantive legal issues surrounding vicarious 
liability and/or direct liability of the appellant.96 Though the Court declined to do so, 
it provided some parameters around the law of vicarious liability; obviously, these 
comments are obiter dicta. However, they are designed to provide guidance for lower 
courts, and will be influential. Having said that, given the past differences of opinion 
among the High Court and other courts on the scope of the principle, it would be a 
brave person to assume that what the High Court said in Prince Alfred College about 
vicarious liability presents the ‘last word’ on the doctrine’s scope in Australia. 
Members of the High Court recognised the notion of ‘scope of employment’ 
had been utilised to frame the parameters of vicarious liability, and this was 
defensible because it provided some objective, rational basis for liability,97 though 
it acknowledged that the question of ‘connection’ with employment did not add 
much to an understanding of an employer’s liability.98 Prince Alfred College 
heralded use of a new concept to explain vicarious liability principle. This was the 
notion of ‘occasion’. The Court agreed with earlier case law that the mere fact 
employment provided an opportunity for the commission of the wrongful act was 
not sufficient in itself to attract vicarious liability. However, if the employment 
situation not only provided the opportunity, but was also the occasion for the 
commission of the wrongful act, vicarious liability could arise: 
[I]t may be sufficient to hold an employer vicariously liable for a criminal act 
committed by an employee where, in the commission of that act, the employee 
used or took advantage of the position in which the employment placed the 
employee vis-à-vis the victim. Consequently, … the relevant approach is to 
consider any special role that the employer has assigned to the employee and 
the position in which the employee is thereby placed vis-à-vis the victim. In 
determining whether the apparent performance of such a role may be said to 
give the “occasion” for the wrongful act, particular features may be taken into 
account. They include authority, power, trust, control and the ability to 
achieve intimacy with the victim. The latter feature may be especially 
important. Where, in such circumstances, the employee takes advantage of his 
or her position with respect to the victim, that may suffice to determine that 
the wrongful act should be regarded as committed in the course or scope of 
employment and as such render the employer vicariously liable.99 
The High Court considered whether the abuser’s role as boarding master 
placed him in a position of power and intimacy with respect to the victim, such that 
the abuser’s role as boarding master ‘gave the occasion’ for the wrongful acts.100  
																																																								
95 Prince Alfred College (2016) 335 ALR 1, 3–4 [8] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ),  
25 [125] (Gageler and Gordon JJ). 
96 Ibid 4 [10] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 26 [128] (Gageler and Gordon JJ). 
97 Ibid 8 [40] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
98 Ibid 14 [68] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
99 Ibid 17 [80]–[81] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 26 [130] (Gageler and Gordon JJ 
agreeing). 
100 Ibid 18 [84] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 26 [130] (Gageler and Gordon JJ 
agreeing).  
2017] LIABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL PROVIDERS 181 
It is considered somewhat difficult to distinguish, as the Court did in Prince Alfred 
College, between cases where the employment provided the opportunity for the 
wrongful act/s to occur, and cases where the employment provided the occasion for 
same. The distinction is important, because it has long been accepted the fact the 
employment provided the opportunity for the wrongful act to occur is insufficient to 
attract vicarious liability, and in Prince Alfred College the Court said the ‘occasion’ 
principle explained and justified imposition of vicarious liability in particular cases. 
It is not entirely clear how the concept of ‘occasion’ adds to ‘scope of employment’ 
notions. If ‘occasion’ is informed by issues like power, control, trust and opportunity 
for intimacy with victims, as the High Court said, one assumes the existence of these 
elements would already be relevant in considering the scope of the employee’s 
employment. As such, it is not clear what, if anything, the concept of ‘occasion’ 
adds. This observation is supported in the decision itself, where the joint reasons 
conclude, in discussing the recent UK decision in Mohamud, that 
the role assigned to the employee … did not provide the occasion for the 
wrongful acts which the employee committed outside the kiosk … What 
occurred after the victim left the kiosk was relevantly unconnected with the 
employee’s employment.101 
In other words, ‘occasion’ and ‘connection with employment’ tend to run together. 
Somewhat paradoxically though, in the judgment of Dixon J in Deatons,102 the 
judgment from which the High Court derived this ‘occasion’ principle, Dixon J 
himself disaggregated the concept of ‘occasion’ from scope questions: 
The occasion for administering [the throwing of the glass] and the form it took 
may have arisen from the fact that she was a barmaid but retribution was not 
within the course of her employment as a barmaid.103 
The fact that, of the Court in Deatons, only Dixon J referred to the concept of 
‘occasion’, and that His Honour found no vicarious liability on the facts although 
admitting the ‘occasion’ for the barmaid’s acts arose from her employment position, 
suggests the need for respectful scepticism as to the utility of the ‘occasion’ concept 
in clarifying the law here. 
If this concept is to continue to be applied, much will turn on its articulation 
and development in future cases. It may be, for example, that the High Court was 
distinguishing a situation where a school cleaner abuses a student from a case where 
a boarding master does so. The Court might utilise the ‘occasion’ principle to justify 
imposition of vicarious liability on the school authority with respect to the abuse of 
the latter, not the former. However, this can lead to fine and arguably arbitrary, 
incoherent distinctions. Say the abuse occurs while the school cleaner is cleaning the 
showers in the dormitories. Can it justifiably be argued the employment was not the 
‘occasion’ for the abuse, because pastoral care was not part of the cleaner’s 
responsibilities, but if the same abuse were committed by the boarding master in the 
same place, the school authority would be liable? And again, what does ‘occasion’ 
add here that considerations of employment scope did not? While the difficulty in 
																																																								
101 Ibid 17 [83] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ) discussing Mohamud [2016] AC 677. 
102 (1949) 79 CLR 370. 
103 Ibid 382. 
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framing appropriate principle in this area is fully acknowledged, I am doubtful the 
concept of ‘occasion’ can provide the desired certainty and workability in this area. 
C United Kingdom 
The House of Lords considered the liability of a school authority for sexual abuse 
committed by their employee boarding master in Lister.104 It accepted and applied 
the ‘close connection’ test espoused in Bazley.105 It found the abuse was ‘inextricably 
interwoven’ with the carrying out by the warden of their responsibilities.106 The 
House acknowledged the two-stage Salmond test struggled with cases of intentional 
wrongdoing.107 Lord Clyde was critical of the theoretical basis of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability.108 Lord Millett thought it was best understood as a ‘loss-
distribution device’.109 It was not enough that the employer gave the employee the 
opportunity to commit the abuse by employing them.110 Lord Hobhouse rejected the 
Bazley approach, particularly its articulation of the policy basis of vicarious liability. 
His Lordship preferred to phrase the inquiry as whether the defendant had ‘assumed 
a relationship to the plaintiff’,111 and entrusted performance of aspects of that 
relationship to others, with consideration of the scope of the employee’s employment 
critical. Specifically, His Lordship found that if the abuse had been committed by a 
groundsperson, the school authority may not have been liable, but because it was 
committed by a boarding master whose responsibilities extended to the provision of 
pastoral care to boarding students, the school was liable.112 
In the course of finding an Institute (Brothers of the Christian Schools) 
vicariously liable for the actions of one of its brothers in abusing children, all 
members of the UK Supreme Court noted:  
The policy objective underlying vicarious liability is to ensure, in so far as it 
is fair, just and reasonable, that liability for tortious wrong is borne by a 
defendant with the means to compensate the victim. Such defendants can 
usually be expected to insure against the risk of such liability, so that this risk 
is more widely spread.113 
The Court found it was usually ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability on an 
employer in cases where the following criteria were satisfied: 
																																																								
104 [2002] 1 AC 215. 
105 Ibid 229 [23] (Lord Steyn), 238 [52] (Lord Hutton agreeing), 237 [48] (Lord Clyde), 245 [70]  
(Lord Millett). 
106 Ibid 230 [28] (Lord Steyn), 238 [52] (Lord Hutton agreeing). 
107 Ibid 226 [20] (Lord Steyn), 238 [52] (Lord Hutton agreeing), 244 [66] (Lord Millett); this was also 
noted in Mohamud [2016] AC 677, 687 [26] (Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Baroness 
Hale, Lord Dyson MR and Lord Reed agreed). 
108 Lister [2002] 1 AC 215, 232 [35]: ‘I am not persuaded that there is any reason of principle or policy 
which can be of substantial guidance in the resolution of the problem of applying the rule  
[of vicarious liability] in any particular case.’ 
109 Ibid 243 [65]. 
110 Ibid 235 [44]–[45] (Lord Clyde), 241 [59] (Lord Hobhouse) and 244 [65] (Lord Millett). 
111 Ibid 238 [54] (Lord Hobhouse). 
112 Ibid 243 [62] (Lord Hobhouse). 
113 Various Claimants [2013] 2 AC 1, 15 [34] (Lord Phillips, for the Court). The school managers had 
been found vicariously liable for the abuse; this was not challenged on appeal. 
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(a) The employer was more likely to have means to compensate the victim 
than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that 
liability; 
(b) The tort will have been committed as a result of activity by the employee 
on behalf of the employer; 
(c) The employee’s activity is part of the employer’s business activity; 
(d) The employer, by employing the employee, has created the risk the 
employee will commit the tort; and 
(e) The employee has to some extent been under the employer’s control.114 
The Supreme Court noted the House of Lords had applied the ‘enterprise risk’ 
approach of Bazley in Dubai Aluminium, before concluding the Institute was liable 
here because of the close connection between the nature of the brothers’ employment 
at the school and the abuse committed.115 Subsequent recent decisions have endorsed 
the enterprise risk approach, ‘fair and just’ criterion, and the close connection test.116 
Recently, it meant the owner of a service station was liable for the actions of their 
kiosk attendant in leaving the kiosk, and then punching and kicking a customer, 
causing them serious injury.117 
Having summarised the existing position in the three jurisdictions, this article 
will now critique the various principles said to underpin these decisions. 
IV Critique of Existing Rationales for Imposition of 
Vicarious Liability 
A Fair, Just and Reasonable Not Appropriate in Australia 
As indicated above, one of the rationales118 currently accepted by courts in the UK 
and Canada for imposition of vicarious liability on an employer is that it is, or may 
be in given cases, fair, just and reasonable to do so.119 This reference to imposition 
of (vicarious) liability where it is fair, just and reasonable has unmistakable parallels 
with the approach to imposition of a duty of care in those jurisdictions.120 
Specifically, in the UK a three-stage test applies to determine whether a duty of care 
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[23]. In terms of discussion below, the concept of ‘fair just and reasonable’ is critiqued in Part III(A), 
the first of Lord Phillips’ criteria is considered in Part III(B), and the second, third and fourth 
considered under Part III C. The final criterion is a standard traditional test for distinguishing between 
an employee and an independent contractor, a distinction also questioned in Part III(C).  
115 Various Claimants [2013] 2 AC 1, 27 (Lord Phillips, for the Court). 
116 Cox [2016] AC 660; Mohamud [2016] AC 677. 
117 Mohamud [2016] AC 677. 
118 It is conceded that, to some extent, the rationales overlap. 
119 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 552–3 [23] (McLachlin J, for the Court); Cox [2016] AC 660, 675 [42] 
(Lord Reed, for the Court); Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 619 [320] (Kirby J). 
120 ‘The imprecise concepts of fairness, justice and reasonableness are central to the law of negligence. 
The test for the existence of a duty of care is whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose such a 
duty’: Mohamud [2016] AC 677, 695 [54] (Lord Dyson MR). 
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is owed; one stage asks whether it would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to recognise 
a duty of care in the given situation.121 A similar approach applies in Canada, which 
uses a modified two-stage approach from Anns v Morton London Borough 
Council,122 where policy considerations including fairness are relevant at the second 
stage.123 In Australia, only Kirby J adopted the three-stage approach in determining 
whether a duty of care was owed, involving consideration of policy factors such as 
fairness.124 In noting this apparent overlap between the use of concepts of fairness 
and justness in establishing that a duty of care is owed, and establishing that 
vicarious liability applies, it is acknowledged that the contexts differ: the former 
involves questions of direct liability; the latter relates to liability for actions or 
omissions of another. 
A unanimous High Court in Sullivan v Moody expressed difficulties with the 
‘fair, just and reasonable’ approach to the question of the existence of a duty of care: 
There is … a danger that the matter of foreseeability … having been 
determined, the succeeding questions will be reduced to a discretionary 
judgment based upon a sense of what is fair, and just and reasonable as an 
outcome in the particular case … The question as to what is fair, and just and 
reasonable is capable of being misunderstood as an invitation to formulate 
policy rather than to search for principle. The concept of policy, in this 
context, is often ill-defined. There are policies at work in the law which can 
be identified and applied to novel problems, but the law of tort develops by 
reference to principles, which must be capable of general application, not 
discretionary decision-making in individual cases.125 
Although it is conceded that these remarks were made in the context of 
application of concepts of fairness, justice and reasonableness to the question of a 
duty of care, they are relevant to use of similar concepts in rationalising imposition 
of vicarious liability in a particular case. They are subjective contested concepts 
unlikely to provide clarity of principle in the vexed area of vicarious liability.126 
Recently in Prince Alfred College, members of the High Court again rejected use of 
concepts of ‘fair and just’ in determining the ambit of vicarious liability.127 
Included within the concept of ‘fair, just and reasonable’ that is rejected as a 
principled basis for vicarious liability are comments indicating it is ‘better’ that the 
loss should fall on the employer than the innocent third party, or that there ‘ought’ 
																																																								
121 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 617–18 (Lord Bridge). 
122  [1978] AC 728, 751–2 (Lord Wilberforce). 
123 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537, [14]. 
124 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 419. Justice Kirby abandoned the three-stage 
approach in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 626 [238]. 
125 (2001) 207 CLR 562, 579 (the Court). Similarly, in the context of vicarious liability, see Callinan J 
in Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 626 [345]: ‘cases would, as a practical matter, be decided according 
to whether the judge or jury thought it “fair and just” to hold the employer liable. Perceptions of 
fairness vary greatly. The law in consequence would be thrown into a state of uncertainty.’ 
126 McIvor, above n 34, 279. 
127 (2016) 335 ALR 1, 9 [45] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). The majority observed that:  
if a general principle provides that liability is to depend upon a primary judge’s assessment of 
what is fair and just, the determination of liability may be rendered easier, even predictable. But 
principles of that kind depend upon policy choices and the allocation of risk, which are matters 
upon which minds may differ. They do not reflect the current state of the law in Australia and 
the balance sought to be achieved by it in the imposition of vicarious liability. 
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to be a remedy for the wrong done to the victim.128 Expression of this sentiment is 
usually traced to Holt CJ in Hern,129 and then reflected in subsequent English130 and 
Australian authority.131 It is reiterated that assessments of where it is ‘better’ that the 
loss lie were made at a time when the generalised duty of care concept did not exist. 
Had it been otherwise, the Court might have found a remedy for the wronged third 
party on the basis the employer had directly breached a duty of care owed to the third 
party. Now that such a duty does exist, the rationale for vicarious liability on the 
basis of where it is ‘better’ or more fair and just that the loss lies has largely 
evaporated. With respect, that observation has not been specifically recognised in 
the case law as it should have been. Such recognition should prompt greater 
willingness to reconceptualise the law in this area. 
B Deep Pockets and Insurance 
Others have pragmatically observed that several of the vicarious liability cases132 
appear to be based on a desire to find a defendant with pockets sufficiently deep to 
pay compensation to a wronged individual.133 I disagree, at the level of principle, 
that any cases can or should be decided based on whether a defendant has ‘deep’ 
pockets. Decisions create precedents and refine principles that will be used in 
subsequent cases. If a precedent establishing liability is made, no-one can be sure 
the context in which it will be used in future. Perhaps it might be used against a 
defendant with ‘shallower’ pockets. Should the original decision be applied? How 
deep must the defendant’s pockets be? This shows the folly of deciding cases based 
on whether a defendant has deep pockets. Courts develop and apply legal principle; 
they are not social welfare agencies concerned with distribution or redistribution of 
wealth.134 I author agree with the High Court in Soblusky v Egan that, while deep 
pockets considerations might explain past cases and development of vicarious 
liability principle, they do not justify it, if the cases depart from sound principle.135 
																																																								
128 Limpus (1862) 1 Hurl & C 526, 539; 158 ER 993, 998 (Willes J): 
there is virtually no remedy against the driver of an omnibus, and therefore it is necessary that, 
for injury resulting from an act done by him in the course of his master’s service, the master 
should be responsible; for there ought to be a remedy against some person capable of paying 
damages to those injured by improper driving. 
129 (1709) 1 Salk 289, 289; 91 ER 256, 256: ‘seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is more 
reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a 
stranger …’. 
130 Lloyd [1912] AC 716, 727 (Earl of Halsbury) citing Hern with evident approval, 738 (Lord 
Macnaghten), 739 (Lord Atkinson agreeing). 
131 Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110, 117 (Isaacs J) (‘Bugge’): ‘it is more just to make the person who 
has entrusted his servant with the power of acting in his business responsible for injury occasioned 
to another in the course of so acting, than that the other and entirely innocent party should be left to 
bear the loss’. 
132 For example, in Various Claimants [2013] 2 AC 1, Lord Phillips noted for the Court that ‘the policy 
objective underlying vicarious liability is to ensure [so far as was just] that liability for tortious 
wrongs is borne by a defendant with the means to compensate the victim’: at 15; and in earlier times 
‘there ought to be a remedy against some person capable of paying damages to those injured by 
improper driving’: Limpus (1862) 1 Hurl & C 526, 539; 158 ER 993, 998 (Willes J). 
133 Baty, above n 23, 154. 
134 See above n 64 and accompanying text. 
135 (1960) 103 CLR 215, 229 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). 
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Williams, canvassing possible rationales for vicarious liability, considered the deep 
pockets theory: 
There is the purely cynical theory that the master is liable because he has a 
purse worth opening. The master is frequently rich, and he is usually insured 
— two arguments that might be used by any burglar, if he ever troubled to 
justify his thefts. The strange thing is to find them put forward by judges of 
eminence [citing Lord Lyndhurst and Willes J] … Whatever … can have put 
this extraordinary idea into judges’ heads, that the mere possession of wealth 
is enough to justify the imposition of legal liability for a wrong …136 
Clearly, this rationale does not explain or justify the traditional distinction between 
employees and independent contractors, to provide one example. 
Further, I do not agree with the creation and application of legal principle 
based on who has, or who has access to, insurance. This is an orthodox position,137 
although some judges have apparently challenged it, expressly taking into account 
the availability or otherwise of insurance in determining whether vicarious liability 
should be imposed.138 This type of reasoning is not employed expressly elsewhere 
in tort law; it should not be permitted here.139 As Atiyah succinctly puts it, the extent 
of insurance is (should be) determined by the law, not the other way round.140 The 
principle of vicarious liability was established before insurance was available;141 
there is an incongruity in using a product developed after the creation of a principle 
to justify and rationalise that principle.142 
C Enterprise Risk 
One rationale the Supreme Court of Canada gave for its interpretation of principles 
of vicarious liability in Bazley was that of ‘enterprise risk’ that the employer had 
introduced the risk of employee wrongdoing, and damage caused by that employee 
was basically a cost of doing business. This theory has to some extent been accepted 
by courts in the UK143 and Australia.144  
While the High Court of Australia did not expressly embrace the concept of 
‘enterprise risk’ in Prince Alfred College, there is an argument that the test espoused 
																																																								
136 Williams, above n 39, 232 (citations omitted). 
137 ‘[A]s a general proposition it has not, I think, been questioned for nearly 200 years that in determining 
the rights inter se of A and B the fact that one or other of them is insured is to be disregarded’: Lister 
v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, 576–7 (Viscount Simonds). See also Hollis 
(2001) 207 CLR 21, 68 [115]–[117] (Callinan J). 
138 Scott (2000) 204 CLR 333, 419 [254] (Gummow J), 439 [310] (Hayne J) and 454 [347] (Callinan J). 
139 ‘[T]hat there is no broad formulation of where and why liability insurance or insurability should be 
a factor relevant to the imposition and shape of liability, suggests that commentators deploy it 
selectively, and therefore unconvincingly, in the normative debate just as they do in the descriptive 
debate’: Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (1995) 58(6) Modern Law Review 820, 829. 
140 Atiyah, above n 30, 27. 
141 Douglas, above n 23, 591. 
142 Ibid. It is conceded that this sometimes, in fact, happens. However, it is logically difficult to accept, 
and when efforts are made to reconceptualise legal principle, illogical premises are best avoided if 
possible. 
143 Dubai Aluminium [2003] 2 AC 366, 377 [21] (Lord Nicholls), 386 [65] (Lord Slynn agreeing), 386 
[66] (Lord Hutton agreeing); Cox [2016] AC 660, 672 [29] (Lord Reed, for the Court).  
144 Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 612–13 [302]–[303] (Kirby J). 
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there of whether the employment provided the ‘occasion’ for the wrongful act is 
somewhat similar to notions of enterprise risk.145 The idea is that just as the fact that 
an enterprise conducts certain activities carries with it inherent risks, the costs of 
which are allocated to the enterprise (according to the enterprise risk theory), so too 
when an enterprise engages individuals to do particular tasks, it might be thought to 
have taken on liability risk associated with performance of such tasks. This is 
concededly speculative; the High Court did not in Prince Alfred College expressly 
make this link. 
Notions of enterprise risk were refined among law and economics scholars in 
the United States (‘US’), and there are some early traces in English cases.146 The 
basic idea is that the full costs of an activity should be borne by the body responsible 
for that activity, rather than shifted elsewhere. This will cause optimal allocation of 
resources.147 As has been noted, this concept of ‘enterprise risk’ is inherently 
difficult to apply to non-profit organisations such as educational authorities.148 Many 
would find it inappropriate and/or offensive to view sexual abuse as a ‘business risk’, 
and compensation to be paid by an employer as a ‘cost of doing business’. 
Even if economic analysis of law is accepted as being of possible relevance 
in this context, and legal principles should be governed or influenced by ‘efficiency’, 
leading law and economics scholars are dubious about the imposition of vicarious 
liability. For example, Sykes posits a situation involving ‘passive victims’, where 
victims will not take ‘cost effective measures’ to protect themselves from harm by 
adopting precautions or avoiding activities that might subject them to it.149 A student 
in a school is considered a ‘passive victim’ in this context.  
In such a situation, Sykes raises the possibility that some employees who 
produce the employer’s goods (or services, in the case of an educational authority) 
commit assaults creating civil liability:  
By hypothesis, neither the probability that an employee will commit an assault 
nor the magnitude of the resulting liability depends upon the employee’s wealth, 
upon whether he is employed or unemployed, or upon any characteristic of his 
employment. In addition, by hypothesis, no incentive mechanism exists that 
would enable the employer to reduce the incidence of employee assaults. To 
																																																								
145 The High Court in obiter dicta in Prince Alfred College (2016) 335 ALR 1 based vicarious liability 
on whether the employment not only provided an opportunity, but also, the ‘occasion for the 
commission of the wrongful act’: at 17 [80] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ), 26 [130] 
(Gageler and Gordon JJ agreeing). Gageler and Gordon JJ, who specifically adopted the factors 
identified in the Canadian and UK case law as relevant to vicarious liability in the context of child 
sexual abuse, denied the tests and principles said to underpin those decisions (including enterprise 
risk): at 26 [130]. Some might quibble with ‘cherry picking’ factors identified in case law in 
comparable jurisdictions, but not the theoretical basis said to underpin them.  
146 Duncan v Findlater (1839) 6 Cl & Fin 894, 910; 7 ER 934, 940 (Lord Brougham); Broom v Morgan 
[1953] 1 QB 597, 608 (Denning LJ); Atiyah, above n 30, 17–18. Baty referred to ‘profit’ as one of 
nine possible rationales for imposing vicarious liability: Baty, above n 23, 148. Others were control, 
revenge, carefulness and choice, identification, evidence, indulgence, danger and satisfaction. 
147 Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70(4) Yale Law 
Journal 499. 
148 Jacobi [1999] 2 SCR 570, 615–16 [75] (Binnie J, for Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ); Townshend-
Smith, above n 5, 121–2. 
149 Alan O Sykes, ‘The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines’ (1988) 101(3) Harvard Law Review 563, 573. 
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hold the employer vicariously liable for such employee assaults, regardless of 
when or where they occur or the identity of the assault victim, is almost certainly 
inefficient. The employer cannot affect the number of assaults or the total 
amount of damages. Thus [where] vicarious liability imposes additional costs 
on the enterprise, it may drive the enterprise out of business or at the very least 
cause it to shrink as the marginal costs of production increase. Society then will 
lose at least some of the economic surplus [not to mention the social benefit] 
from the production of the enterprise.150 
Sykes concludes vicarious liability is ‘probably inefficient’ if two conditions 
exist — the enterprise does not cause the wrong, and the enterprise cannot reduce 
the probability of it occurring through incentive contracts with employees.151 He 
finds that in circumstances where the causal relationship between the activities of 
the employer and the prospective wrong is weak, direct negligence is more efficient 
than vicarious liability.152 Regarding this first requirement, the courts have stressed 
the mere fact that employment of the abuser gave them the opportunity to commit 
the abuse is insufficient to find the employer liable, so it cannot be said the employer 
‘caused’ the wrong, in relation to one of their employees abusing students. Indeed, 
if they could be said to have caused the wrong, they would be liable directly, without 
the need for recourse to vicarious liability. Regarding the second, it is hardly 
practical to reduce the likelihood of abuse by including incentives in employment 
contracts. If the prospect of jail term and instant dismissal from employment for 
abusing children does not deter wrongdoers, there is nothing else the employer can 
do to dissuade a would-be abuser. In summary, of the two conditions articulated by 
a leading law and economics scholar for vicarious liability being a more ‘efficient’ 
means of considering liability, neither applies in the current context. 
Ironically then, according to one leading law and economics scholar, it is not 
‘efficient’ to make an educational authority liable for abuse committed by an 
employee, yet efficiency underlies the basis of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
‘enterprise risk’ doctrine in Bazley, as subsequently applied by courts in the UK. 
Further, tort law is incoherent if it accepts concepts of enterprise risk in the context 
of vicarious liability when it does not, for instance, in the context of product liability 
or car accidents.153 Further, notions of enterprise risk do not explain or justify why 
traditionally vicarious liability distinguishes actions of employees and independent 
contractors, nor why an employee remains liable for the tort, even if it occurred 
pursuant to furtherance of the enterprise (and, logically, its costs might be borne 
solely by it).154 It is difficult to apply it to non-profit organisations, as the UK 
Supreme Court concluded in Jacobi. 
Even if enterprise risk justifies, to some extent, the imposition of vicarious 
liability, its rationale requires limited application of the doctrine. As Smith noted: 
																																																								
150 Ibid 574. 
151 Ibid 575. 
152 Ibid 579. 
153 Lewis Klar, ‘Vicarious Liability’ in Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts (Thomson Reuters, 10th ed, 2011) 459. 
154 J W Neyers, ‘A Theory of Vicarious Liability’ (2005) 43(2) Alberta Law Review 287, 298–9; 
Calabresi, above n 147, 543–7. 
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To make the entrepreneur responsible for acts of his employees in no way 
connected with the enterprise would be undesirable because it would result in 
including in the cost of production an item which economically does not 
belong there.155 
I therefore agree with the reticence expressed by members of the High Court of 
Australia in Lepore towards adoption of ‘enterprise risk’ theory to rationalise the 
imposition of vicarious liability,156 at least in the current context of the liability of 
educational providers to victims of abuse. The mere fact the employment provided 
the ‘occasion’ for the wrongful act/s to occur would, on this basis, not be sufficient 
either to impose liability, if I am correct in at least broadly equating notions of 
‘occasion’ with ‘enterprise’. Sykes concluded vicarious liability was not efficient 
where an employer did not cause the wrong, and could not reduce its probability 
through contract provision. The fact an employment context provided the occasion 
for the wrong does not mean that the employer caused the wrong. 
D Deterrence 
Another justification given for the imposition of vicarious liability is the policy role 
it can arguably play in providing deterrence to socially undesirable behaviour. In 
Bazley v Curry, McLachlin J for the Court cited Fleming as identifying deterrence, 
together with what was a ‘just and practical remedy’, as two key rationales of 
vicarious liability.157 Her Honour said that making an employer liable for the 
wrongful acts of employees could have a deterrent effect, given employers could 
often reduce risks by ‘efficient organisation and supervision’.158 
However, as Gummow and Hayne JJ explained in Lepore in terms of 
deterrence, if the possibility of criminal conviction and punishment does not prevent 
the abuser from committing the abuse, it seems unlikely that the possibility of the 
imposition of civil liability will do so.159 And employers can be held directly liable 
for negligence in the selection of employees, or bad workplace practices including 
failure to supervise, quite independently of the imposition of vicarious liability. As 
such, deterrence is not accepted as a theoretical justification for imposition of 
vicarious liability. McIvor rejects deterrence reasoning in Bazley as ‘naïve and 
simplistic’.160 
In summary, none of the concepts of fair, just and reasonable; deep pockets; 
availability of insurance; deterrence or enterprise risk adequately explain and justify 
imposition of vicarious liability in particular instances. Part V of this article will now 
consider the potential of agency doctrine to provide the theoretical basis for vicarious 
liability, acknowledging that not every precedent can be fitted within its bounds. 
																																																								
155 Young B Smith, ‘Frolic and Detour’ (1923) 23(5) Columbia Law Review 444, 461. 
156 (2003) 212 CLR 511, 586–9 [214]–[223] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
157 [1999] 2 SCR 534, 551–2 [29] citing John G Fleming, The Law of Torts (LBC Information Services, 
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158 Ibid 554 [32] (McLachlin J, for the Court). 
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V Agency 
I do not accept the position of some courts and academics that a search for a coherent 
theoretical underpinning or justification of the law of vicarious liability will be in 
vain, and that there are multiple rationales, none of which is entirely satisfactory of 
itself.161 I believe that if legal principles are to be applied, they must have theoretical 
underpinning because this assists the objective resolution of novel cases, and 
encourages the resolution of disputes via principle, not deep pockets, insurance or 
subjective assessments of what is ‘fair and just’. 
The most promising theoretical basis upon which to justify the principle of 
vicarious liability is considered that of agency. It is conceded that some existing 
vicarious liability precedents cannot be justified as instances of agency doctrine. If 
so, they should no longer be considered good law. It is time the law made an effort 
to reconceptualise principle in this area into a coherent and functional whole. It will 
be impossible to do this if we remain wedded to all of the past case law. Some see 
the purpose of academic writing as an attempt to provide a theoretical underpinning 
for past case law, explaining what has occurred in the past in terms of a coherent, 
all-inclusive theory. In the area of vicarious liability, we must accept such an attempt 
is actually not possible. We must be prepared to jettison some of the old, to move 
forward with a coherent approach for the future. 
Arguments that vicarious liability is an example of agency theory are not 
new. However, those arguments are becoming less easy to discern in the modern 
case law. They justified the initial conception of vicarious liability as relating to 
something the employer had expressly or impliedly commanded or authorised, as 
Holmes discusses in his treatment of vicarious liability in an article entitled 
‘Agency’.162 The agency nature of vicarious liability was acknowledged in Colonial 
Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-Operative 
Assurance Co of Australia Ltd. 163 Justice Dixon, with whom Rich J agreed, held ‘the 
rule which imposes liability upon a master for the wrongs of his servant committed 
in the course of his employment is commonly regarded as part of the law of 
agency’.164 Chief Justice Gavan Duffy and Justice Starke discussed vicarious 
liability in terms of what the employer had expressly authorised the employee to do 
or was within the scope of the employee’s (agent’s) authority.165 It was referred to 
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for Sexual Harassment’ (2002) 104(3) West Virginia Law Review 517, 527–8: 
[T]he law of torts fails to provide an adequate explanation for vicarious liability because it is not 
a tort law doctrine … Vicarious liability … is based in the agency relationship itself and is not 
dependent on tort principles such as fault or on tort policies such as accident prevention. 
163 (1931) 46 CLR 41. 
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expressly by the Canadian Supreme Court,166 and by Lord Wilberforce.167 The 
judgments of Latham CJ and Dixon J in Deatons include some indirect support for 
the agency basis of vicarious liability, as will be noted presently. 
The basis of vicarious liability in the law of agency was discussed at length 
by McHugh J in Scott,168 and applied by him in Hollis.169 Justice Kirby accepted and 
applied agency theory of vicarious liability in Sweeney.170 In Lepore, Gaudron J 
accepted agency as providing theoretical justification for vicarious liability:  
If vicarious liability is to be imposed so that a person is to be held liable in 
damages for injury suffered without fault on [their] part, it ought to be 
imposed only in circumstances where it can be justified by reference to legal 
principle … [T]o hold an employer liable for the authorised acts of an 
employee or acts done in the course of his or her employment, is simply to 
apply the ordinary law of agency.171 
In the same case, Gummow and Hayne JJ used words associated with agency in 
clarifying the extent of vicarious liability.172 Agency principles were not discussed 
in Prince Alfred College. 
Acknowledging that the concept of ‘agency’ can mean many different things 
to different people, and be used in different contexts, it is used here to mean the 
situation where one person (A) is acting on behalf of another (B), such that it can be 
said that A’s actions are really those of B (the ‘broad view’). Obviously this can 
include express, apparent and ostensible authority. This is a wider meaning of the 
word agency than that of someone who has the capacity to make legal relations 
between a principal and a third party (the ‘narrow view’).173 This distinction is 
important. Support for the broad view of the concept of agency appears (implicitly) 
in Scott, Hollis, Sweeney and Lepore. These cases did not involve situations where 
the worker had the ability to enter into legal contracts on behalf of another, yet they 
were rationalised by some as involving ‘agency’ principles. Implicit is acceptance 
of a broad view of agency. 
																																																								
166 Bazley [1999] 2 SCR 534, 546 (McLachlin J, for the Court) (citations omitted) (emphasis altered): 
  The cases confirming vicarious liability on the basis that the employee was acting in furtherance 
of the employer’s aims rely on the agency rationale implicit in the Salmond test. Because the 
employee was acting in furtherance of the employer’s aims, he or she is said to have ‘ostensible’ 
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negligent accident. 
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171 (2003) 212 CLR 511, 560 [128]. 
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173 International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 
CLR 644, 652 (the Court). 
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In the US, § 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency174 confirms links 
between vicarious liability and agency. Stating an employer is liable for an 
employee’s actions occurring within the scope of employment,175 the section states 
an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the 
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.176 It further clarifies that 
actions are not within the scope of employment when they occur ‘within an 
independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of 
the employer’.177 This mirrors comments by both Latham CJ and Dixon J in Deatons, 
a vicarious liability case where both considered whether the employee’s actions were 
done ‘in furtherance of the interests of the employer’.178 Focus on whether the act 
complained of was intended to serve the employer’s purpose has been a consistent 
theme of agency restatements, and is consistent with questions regarding whether 
the employer is on a ‘frolic’, and past concern in English case law with whether the 
employee’s actions were, or intended to be, for the employer’s benefit. An employer 
may also be liable on the basis of apparent authority.179 
Given Beuermann’s important work in this area,180 this article should explain 
the extent to which my theory relates to Beuermann’s theory. I will focus primarily 
here on Beuermann’s theory of conferred authority strict liability. Fundamentally, 
our work is not inconsistent, but has different objectives. Neither of us apparently 
think vicarious liability is an appropriate vehicle for resolution of institutional child 
sex abuse claims.181 Neither of us think vicarious liability is appropriate when 
dealing with intentional wrongful conduct. We agree vicarious liability should be 
confined to what an employer institution has expressly or impliedly authorised.182 
While my concern here is to clarify the contours of the law of vicarious liability, 
Beuermann has a different concern. She advocates for recognition of ‘conferred 
authority strict liability’.183 She expressly distinguishes this from vicarious 
liability.184 At first, it might seem our work overlaps, because Beuermann uses 
concepts such as ‘authority’ and ‘apparent authority’, terms sometimes associated 
with the law of agency, which is the principle I utilise. However, the learned scholar 
does not use the word ‘agency’ in explaining her theory, and my reading of her work 
suggests she does not mean these words in the ‘agency’ sense. As such, it is a 
different theory than the one posited here. 
Her theory is that an institution is (should be) strictly liable for child sexual 
abuse committed by a person on whom authority has been conferred, by an 
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institution which itself has been conferred with authority.185 School teachers for 
example are conferred with authority over students by the educational institution, 
which derives such authority through legislation. This gives teachers power to direct 
students. Beuermann says this power is the source and rationale for the imposition 
of strict liability. This is her ‘conferred authority strict liability’, similar to the 
previously discarded non-delegable duty principle in the context of intentional 
wrongdoing. Her suggestion is largely supported by the recommendation in the 
Redress Report to reintroduce non-delegable duties in this context.186 I hope to 
consider her interesting theory of ‘conferred liability strict liability’ and the Report’s 
recommendations in relation to non-delegable duties in future work. 
However, for the purposes of this article, Beuermann’s work on conferred 
authority strict liability is not of central importance, because the purpose of this 
article is to outline the confines of the vicarious liability doctrine, while the purpose 
of Beuermann’s work is effectively to seek the reintroduction of a non-delegable 
duty of care in the current context. She does not argue for change to the law of 
vicarious liability; while I do. She advocates for the reintroduction of a 
non-delegable duty in this context; I do not.  
In a book chapter, Beuermann does discuss vicarious liability in the context 
of ‘agency’.187 However, importantly, she is using the ‘narrow view’ of agency to 
mean someone with the authority to effect (transactional) legal relations on behalf 
of another,188 though she admits that in some cases a broader conception of agency 
has been utilised.189 I indicated above the broad view of agency is adopted here, and 
has support in Australian case law. Beuermann’s comments about vicarious liability 
in relation to an ‘agent’ in that chapter must be seen in the context of her narrow 
view of agency, because that affects her position on the extent to which an 
organisation should be vicariously liable for conduct of an ‘agent’, in the sense she 
uses the term.190 As indicated above, the ‘broad view’ of agency is used here, in line 
with Australian authority, and this difference in definition is critical. In adopting the 
narrow view of an ‘agent’, she does not suggest this concept be used to 
reconceptualise the law of vicarious liability, which is the argument made here. In 
this way, our work differs. 
While no doubt imperfect, the idea that vicarious liability is based on 
principles of agency has several practical advantages. First, it removes the existing 
strict dichotomy between employees (for whom the employer will be vicariously 
liable for actions within scope of employment), and independent contractors (for 
whom the employer is not vicariously liable). As indicated by McHugh J and 
others,191 the continued merit of this distinction is questionable given changes in the 
nature of employment over time. It is incoherent with the enterprise risk basis of 
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liability or the fair, just and reasonable theory, since loss caused by an independent 
contractor may be considered just as much ‘a cost of doing business’ as what an 
employee does, and it might be fair, just and reasonable for an employer to be 
vicariously liable for what an independent contractor did, yet the traditional 
distinction precludes it. To be clear, neither the enterprise risk approach nor the fair, 
just and reasonable approach is defended here; rather the point is that the distinction 
between employees and independent contractors is not supported by any of the 
current suggested rationales for the doctrine. Its discard should be unlamented. 
The second advantage is to prevent situations where an employer is liable for 
actions of an employee that have been specifically prohibited by the employer. I 
cannot support precedents where an employer is liable for injuries caused when the 
employee has defied specific employer instructions in causing loss to a third party.192 
These are not really acts of the employer, and the employer should not be vicariously 
liable for them. Nor can it be accepted that an employer should be (vicariously) liable 
for actions they never would have approved of or authorised, had they been 
consulted. This means that in most, if not all, cases in which an employee is guilty 
of intentional, and in some cases criminal, wrongdoing, the employer would not be 
vicariously liable for this behaviour.193 If the rationales of enterprise risk, deep 
pockets and fair, just and reasonable are not accepted (as has been suggested above), 
there is little left to conceptually justify why an employer should be liable for actions 
they either specifically prohibited, or would never have authorised, if asked. Thus, I 
must respectfully disagree with Beuermann’s acceptance of liability in cases where 
an employer in this context would never have authorised the particular acts of 
wrongdoing and/or cases of intentional wrongdoing,194 though I concede her 
acceptance of this outcome is via use of the doctrine of ‘conferred authority strict 
liability’, which she distinguishes from vicarious liability.195 
In this regard, the focus of the US Third Restatement of Agency on whether 
the employee’s actions were intended to serve the purpose of the employer is 
welcome. It was the position of the common law in the UK until Lloyd in 1912.196 
In 1873, for example, the Court found in Barwick that the ‘general rule is, that the 
master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed 
in the course of the service and for the master’s benefit’.197 In 1919 in Australia, a 
member of the High Court asked whether the employee in question ‘assumed to act 
within the scope of their employment’.198 
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However, the House of Lords in Lloyd interpreted the 1873 decision as not 
requiring the act of the wrongdoer be for the master’s benefit; merely that this was 
the factual scenario in Barwick. With respect, some reasoning of the judges in Lloyd 
is open to serious question. In explaining why the employer was liable, Earl 
Halsbury claimed the employee had breached a duty to apply diligence and honesty 
in carrying out business within their delegated powers.199 The Earl cited with 
approval comments by Holt CJ in an earlier case that a merchant was liable for the 
deceit of his factor because someone had to be a ‘loser’, and there was more reason 
that the employer who employs the deceiver and places their trust and confidence in 
them should be the loser than the customer.200 Lord Macnaghten took a similar view, 
asking ‘who is to suffer for this man’s fraud’, the innocent customer or the employer 
‘who put this rogue in his place and clothed him with his authority …’201 His 
Lordship added an employer could insure against the dishonesty of employees or 
make them sign a ‘fidelity’ policy.202 
With respect, these comments are findings of fault against the employer for 
employing the dishonest employee. In 1912, a generalised duty of care did not exist. 
Findings of negligence were dependent on bringing relations between the parties 
into a pre-existing recognised category in which duties of care were owed. This 
might explain the apparent intrusion of fault concepts into consideration of a doctrine 
of strict liability in vicarious liability. However, since 1932, when a generalised 
fault-based duty of care was recognised,203 it surely became illegitimate and 
incoherent to base the imposition of strict liability on notions of fault around the 
employment of a dishonest individual. Fault in the employment of a dishonest 
employee is relevant to a direct claim of negligence against the employer; it is not 
relevant to consideration of a vicarious liability claim against them. So, while Lloyd 
is explicable according to other aspects of tort law as they stood in 1912, its 
reasoning has been significantly undercut by broad acceptance of fault-based 
liability in negligence. This has not been recognised in the case law. And its other 
bases in deep pockets and insurance are not accepted, for reasons given earlier. 
Even if we accept the notion of ‘enterprise risk’ is at least an arguable 
justification for imposing vicarious liability, on the basis of properly allocating the 
costs of an activity to ensure a more optimal allocation of resources, we must be 
aware of ‘over-allocation’ of costs. Smith warned against including costs that 
‘economically do not belong’. It is argued the cost of actions of an employee not 
acting pursuant to the employer’s interests does not ‘belong’ with the employer. In 
other words, there is a link between a theory of enterprise risk and the idea that an 
employer should only be liable for actions of an employer designed to benefit the 
employer. This link remains in the US jurisprudence, evidenced by the Third 
Restatement of Agency, but it was severed in 1912 when the House of Lords decided 
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Lloyd, and incoherence in the UK continues when the courts apply the principles of 
Bazley, but do not accept the enterprise risk methodology underlying it. 
The practical effect of applying vicarious liability principles through the 
doctrine of agency will be a reduction in claims for which the employer will be 
liable. This is acknowledged by Oxford. Writing of two cases involving alleged 
vicarious liability, one involving a police officer involved in sexual activity with a 
store employee while on duty, another involving a pastor sexually abusing a child, 
he states: 
In neither case did the agent act on express or implied directions of the 
respective principal. In addition, neither party acted with intent to serve his 
principal, but acted out of his own self-interest. Accordingly, both sexual 
assaults were outside the scope of employment. If both [complainants] 
understood that their attacker committed torts without acting on behalf of the 
respective principal — lacking the requisite reasonable belief of authority — 
then neither principal should be vicariously liable for their agent’s intentional 
physical torts.204 
Acceptance of this approach would mean that precedent such as Lister in the 
UK and Bazley in Canada would no longer be regarded as good law. Nor does it fit 
with the Australian High Court’s articulation of the ‘occasion’ principle in recent 
times.205 The recent Mohamud decision, where an employer was liable for a retail 
employee who left his work station and violently assaulted a customer, would not be 
accepted.206 There are numerous cases in the US where vicarious liability for sexual 
assaults of employees has been denied because the employee was not acting in 
furtherance of the employer’s interests.207 Counter-intuitively, it appears easier to 
make an employer liable for wilful acts of their employees in the UK than the US. 
Reduction in the ambit of vicarious liability claims against employers is 
independent of the extent to which an employer is directly liable for breaching their 
duty of care. Specifically, that an educational institution is not vicariously liable for 
sexual abuse committed by one of their employees on students within the 
institution’s care is not the end of the (liability) story. That institution may be directly 
liable in negligence, for employing a person with a past criminal history of sexual 
abuse, engaging an employee who was otherwise inappropriate for the position, not 
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supervising that employee sufficiently, or inadequate systems (for example, a policy 
requiring employees not be alone with students at ‘vulnerable’ times). This article 
says nothing about the educational institution’s direct liability in negligence for these 
types of failures. It simply takes issue with the unprincipled use of the vicarious 
liability concept in such a situation. Suffice to say that a narrowing of vicarious 
liability in the way suggested in this article is not intended to mean, and does not 
necessarily mean, that a person subject to sexual abuse within an educational 
institution will be left without a legal remedy. 
VI Conclusion 
More victims of institutional sexual abuse are coming forward to acknowledge the 
pain and suffering to which they have been subject, and to seek redress for past 
atrocities. One aspect of the societal response to such events is the legal response, 
and, in particular, the question of liability of the institution, particularly here 
educational institutions, either directly, or through the doctrine of vicarious liability. 
These events cause us to consider the theoretical basis of these doctrines and their 
place in tort law in more detail. 
The doctrine of vicarious liability has moved well beyond its historical roots, 
undermining its traditional rationale. Some of the reasoning of previous cases has 
been undermined by developments elsewhere in the law of tort. Various rationales 
continue to be suggested, but none of these in themselves can adequately explain 
and justify the state of the existing authorities. This article has found that none of the 
theories of what is fair, just and reasonable, deep pockets, insurance, enterprise risk 
or deterrence provide the needed theoretical underpinning for the doctrine. Though 
some simply lament this unsatisfactory state of affairs, this article has assumed that 
such a state of affairs is unacceptable, and some reconceptualisation of the law in 
this area necessary. 
Though no resolution is perfect, this article has suggested the doctrine of 
agency could be utilised in this reconceptualisation. It has indicated that in some of 
the past vicarious liability cases, notions of agency were evident. The focus in terms 
of vicarious liability should be on the extent to which the employee was acting in 
pursuit of the employer’s interests. This means that where an employee is on a frolic 
of their own, when they are engaged in activities which the employer did not and 
would never have authorised, and/or where they are engaged in criminal activity, 
vicarious liability should not apply. This approach should also be taken in the 
context of institutional sexual abuse. This relates only to the doctrine of vicarious 
liability. It does not, and is not designed to, preclude victims of institutional child 
sexual abuse from obtaining legal redress through other avenues, for example by 
arguing that the institution at which the abuse occurred is directly liable, rather than 
vicariously through actions of an employee of which they were not aware, and 
would never have authorised. Victims of wrongdoing are entitled to justice, but 
legal principle must be coherent. 
